fragmentos (non-political)

19th January 2016, 14:36
About Zizek videogame persona theory (Perverts guide to cinema)

Quote:
Originally Posted by Бай Ганьо View Post
Yes, difficult to understand, for someone who doesn't share your common sense.

So what's so difficult to understand?

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17th January 2016, 11:56

We have our own charge of caricatural internet personas here in revleft; perusing the members list and taking a look on banned members may give us an insight of what we are talking about.

Here are some examples:

Marsella
Master Che
slim

Those would probably give material for good study cases about internet personas and their relation to the people who manage them. Was Master Che an insecure teenager living in the United States and pretending to be a Brazilian hardline Stalinist transexual revolutionary leader in the internet, or a Brazilian hardline Stalinist transexual revolutionary leader pretending to be an insecure teenager living in the United States in this thing we call "real life"?

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16th January 2016, 20:39

Quote:
Originally Posted by Thirsty Crow View Post
He doesn't mean anything.

Of course he means, and it is even easy to understand.

Common sence has that weak people invent violent imaginary online personas for themselves, to overcompensate their real life weakness. Difficult to understand?

Zizek suggests that the opposite may be true: that people invent a social persona that is mild and agreeable, because this is necessary to survive, and revert to their "real" violent self when in the anonimity of the internet. Difficult to understand?

It is only difficult to understand if you have previously decided that you don't want to understand. Otherwise it is quite clear. Whether it is true or not, that's a different issue.

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14th January 2016, 18:49

Quote:
Originally Posted by Invader Zim View Post
I was playing tetris the other day, what dark "psychic truth" does that reveal? How about Portal? Mario Kart? Theme Hospital?

I suppose he was talking of things like "Second Life", or perhaps more generally of internet personas constructed to interact in forums, chat rooms, etc.

Oviously if you play Tetris you are a pervert who likes to insert pointy geometrical shapes into the symbolic uterus of bottom of the screen, but other than that I don't think sweeping psychologist conclusions are warranted here.

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17th August 2015, 14:59
Is Trump a Democratic "wolf" in Republican clothing?

Whatever he thinks he is doing, Donald Trump is just exposing the ridicule of the GOP worldwide.

His menstruation comment against Megyn Kelly just hit the roof.

Quote:
Originally Posted by the rest of the Republican "field"
Hey, Mr. Trump, how dare you talk about Comrade Kelly's period? It is distracting us from our discussion on how to send all women who have an abortion into jail! What are you trying to do, to make people believe we are a bunch of misogynists???

Your political system would be funny if it wasn't so scary.

4th May 2015, 21:48
Marxist Tests

Is history guided by materialism and will naturally create social progress?

This for instance. No, history isn't "guided" by materialism (or by anything else, btw), and it obviously cannot "create" social progress ("history" is not a subject), much less "naturally". So, a Marxist would have to answer "no" here. But this is a question that does not address the divide between Marxists and non-Marxists - lots of non-Marxists, even anti-Marxists, would probably answer "no" too.

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4th May 2015, 21:23

Quote:
Originally Posted by mushroompizza View Post
Well help me out I want to perfect it, give me about 12 simple points to each philosophy so I can create a new test.

First, a Marxist would have to at least try to understand what LTV is; a person with no clue about it cannot be a Marxist, strictly speaking. So a few questions about LTV would be in order.

Second, a Marxist would have to understand capitalism as a historically given system - not an eternal, a-historic principle of organisation, much less as an ethichal issue (words like "deserve", "just", "fair", are utterly un-Marxist in nature; they make answering impossible, because both considering something "fair" or "unfair" are outside the reach of Marxism).

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24th February 2015, 14:26
Poll: Where will the revolution begin and why?

Originally Posted by Tim Cornelis View Post
We haven't had a bourgeois revolution yet.
You stageist, you.

OK, what about France? Or is someone going to say that France hasn't had a bourgeois revolution either?

240px-Anonymous_-_Prise_de_la_Bastille.jpg

Above, the French not having a bourgeois revolution.

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10th December 2014, 16:27

Why isn't there a "Netherlands" option?

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13th August 2014, 14:12
Revleft purges

Originally Posted by PhoenixAsh View Post
Your comparison to genocide and slavery is used in exactly the same way, with exactly the same rationale as the opposing side…both arguing the opposite point arrived from applying the same logic. Applying your own arguments made previously in this thread regarding the judicial and legal defintion being the central important definition we should use (in the case of establishing if something is rape or not)…then your own argument shows its invalidity. Ironically applying this same rationale you yourself applied previously would mean that personhood is legally defined. If it is legally defined as some person not actually being a person…then according to your logic…that person is not a person. See what my issue is with your arguments.

And again you miss the point completely.

If the legal system allows for slavery, it must consider some human beings not persons. If a legal system consider some human beings as non-persons, then it at least doesn't close the door to slavery. You cannot have slavery without a juridical concept of (human) non-persons, and if you have a juridical concept of human non-persons, you would have to either allow slavery or rely on some convoluted legal clauses to forbid it.

That's what is considered "discussing the issue under a juridical point of view"; not taking a given legal system (be it that of 2014 Netherlands or 1863 CSA) and then concluding from it whether Blacks are or are not persons (in 1863 CSA, they weren't; in 2014 Netherlands they are).

You can of course discuss those issues from an ethical or moral or biological or religious standpoint. But then your conclusions won't have much juridical standing.

(You can discuss "lying" from a moral point of view, and quite probably conclude it is morally wrong. It doesn't follow that it should be legally forbidden. You can discuss "lying" from a juridical point of view, and quite probably conclude that it is impossible, or undesirable, to forbid it. It doesn't follow that it is morally right.)

Quote:
Both articles however deal with the same central issue: personhood, its relevance, and its weight towards the personhood of another.

They do deal with the same central issue. Just like an article by Ptolemy and an article by Copernicus would deal with the "same central issue": whether the Earth is the centre of the universe or not. It doesn't mean that they use the same premises, or that their truth value is the same.

Quote:
What you seem to confuse is the conclusions and the context in which it is argued.

BOTH however use the cenntral premise: how does personhood of the fetus affect the central issue.

This isn't a premise. A premise is not a question.

What you seem impressed by is the fact that I (and of course others) reacted far more violently against Giublini & Minerva's than against Thomson's. That would be because Giublini & Minerva sound as a ridiculous strawmaning of "pro-choice" positions, while Thomson is quite within what one would consider "reasonable". The difference is in their conclusion, of course; but such conclusions are based on their premises. Since neither seem to use particularly faulty logic, it seems that the premises of either one are false. Since the basic premise of Thomson is "personhood is irrelevant for the debate on abortion", and Giublini & Minerva's basic premise is that "personhood is the central point in the debate on abortion", this is more clear: either it is relevant, and Thomson is wrong, or it is not, and Giublini and Minerva are wrong.

Of course, a further point of contention is that both articles confuse the ethical with the juridical debate. And so, the concept of "personhood" they are discussing is not the juridical concept, but the ethical one. This partially explains why Thomson's article is better than Giublini & Minerva's: because the ethical concept of "personhood" is indeed irrelevant to the juridical debate on abortion. It however doesn't show whether the juridical concept of "personhood" is or is not irrelevant to the juridical issue of abortion.

About this, I started this debate with you convinced that the juridical concept of "personhood" is basic to the debate on abortion. On further thought, I am tempted to change my position. It seems to me now that instead of the juridical concept of "personhood" being the base on which legislation on abortion should be conducted, that on the contrary, the juridical concept of "personhood" has to be based on the debate on abortion. But then not the ethical debate on abortion, but the juridical debate on abortion. That the juridical concepts of "personhood" and "abortion" are intimately intertwinned, though, I have little doubt.

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